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states which have reworded section 2-318 to expressly abolish the
defense of privity in breach of warranty causes of action.'12 Such
legislation would foster the equitable result strived for by the
Schiavone court without requiring the courts to "astutely" stretch
tort causes of action to redress contract damages.
Rosemary B. Boller
Party to contract may not offer evidence of other party's prior
contradictory agreement with third party
The parol evidence rule prohibits parties to an integrated con-
tract from contradicting the terms of the writing with their prior or
contemporaneous agreements. 1" 3 To avoid the harsh results of in-
effect of the amendment, while "not[ing] the likelihood of disagreement as to its effect
should a case arise in which its applicability may properly be considered." Id. As predicted
by the Court, there is disagreement as to the amendment's effect in light of Martin, with
some courts disregarding Martin, see, e.g., Atkinson v. Ormont Mach. Co., 102 Misc. 2d 468,
469, 423 N.Y.S.2d 577, 579 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1979); Martin v. Drackett Prods. Co.,
100 Misc. 2d 728, 733, 420 N.Y.S.2d 147, 150 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1979), and others view-
ing the Court of Appeal's decision as retaining the defense of privity in implied warranty
actions. See, e.g., Held v. 7-Eleven Food Stores, 438 N.Y.S.2d 976, 979 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1981) (dictum).
112 See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-318 (Supp. 1981-1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 106, § 2-318 (West 1981); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 382-A. 2-318 (Supp. 1979); VA.
CODE § 8.2-318 (1965). Through amendments to section 2-318 of the U.C.C., several states
have expressly abolished the defense of lack of privity in products liability cases. The Mas-
sachusetts provision, for example, states that "[l]ack of privity between plaintiff and defen-
dant shall be no defense in any action brought against the manufacturer, seller, lessor or
supplier of goods . . .[provided the plaintiff was a foreseeable user or consumer of the
goods]." MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-318 (West 1981); see J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-3, at 404 n.20 (2d ed. 1980).
"3 See Loch Sheldrake Assocs. v. Evans, 306 N.Y. 297, 305, 118 N.E.2d 444, 447 (1954);
Heller v. Pope, 250 N.Y. 132, 135, 164 N.E. 881, 882 (1928); Allen v. Oneida, 210 N.Y. 496,
503, 104 N.E. 920, 922 (1914); Thomas v. Scutt, 127 N.Y. 133, 137 (1891). The parol evi-
dence rule has been well established in New York since the 19th century. See, e.g., Hutchins
v. Hebbard, 34 N.Y. 24, 26 (1865); Barry v. Ransom, 12 N.Y. 462, 464 (1855). Judge Pound
stated that "[p]arol evidence may not be received to vary the clear and unambiguous terms
of a solemn written agreement as between the parties ...." Newburger v. American Sur.
Co., 242 N.Y. 134, 142, 151 N.E. 155, 157 (1926). The rule has been used repeatedly by the
New York courts in determining whether to admit evidence of terms other than those em-
bodied in the language of a written contract. See Sabo v. Delman, 3 N.Y.2d 155, 161, 143
N.E.2d 906, 908, 164 N.Y.S.2d 714, 717 (1957); Smith v. Dotterweich, 200 N.Y. 299, 305, 93
N.E. 985, 987 (1911); Aratari v. Chrysler Corp., 35 App. Div. 2d 1077, 1077, 316 N.Y.S.2d
680, 681 (4th Dep't 1970).
The parol evidence rule was created to prevent fraud, avoid the danger of memory
lapses, and minimize the effect of the death of key witnesses. Less v. Lamprecht, 196 N.Y.
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flexible application, the rule has been interpreted liberally.114
32, 36, 89 N.E. 365, 366 (1909). Another purpose of the parol evidence rule was to promote
stability in commercial agreements. See Note, The Parol Evidence Rule and Third Parties,
41 FORDHAM L. REv. 945, 948 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Third Parties]. The rule
applies to prior oral and written agreements between the parties. 4 S. WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS § 631, at 948-49 (3d ed. 1961). The rule, however, does not bar their subsequent oral,
Miles v. Houghtaling, 32 App. Div. 2d 714, 715, 300 N.Y.S.2d 5, 6 (3d Dep't 1969), or written
agreements, Haight v. Cohen, 123 App. Div. 707, 708, 108 N.Y.S. 502, 502 (2d Dep't 1908).
The major area of dispute concerning the applicability of the rule centers around the
threshold question of whether an agreement is integrated. See Note, Third Parties, supra,
at 952-54. This is a factual determination which must be done on a case-by-case basis. See
Mitchill v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377, 388, 160 N.E. 646, 650 (1928) (Lehman, J., dissenting). Pro-
fessor Corbin would allow extrinsic evidence to show the parties' intent as to integration. 3
A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 573, at 360-69 & § 582, at 444-64 (1961). Professor Williston pro-
posed a narrower approach in determining the intent of the parties concerning integration
of the agreement. He placed great emphasis on the completeness of the written agreement
itself. 4 S. WILLISTON, supra, § 633, at 1016. New York has been categorized as using Willis-
ton's strict interpretation to determine whether a contract is integrated. See J. CALAMARI &
J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 110-11 & n.67 (2d ed. 1977).
Despite its name, the parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive law, not one of evi-
dence. Higgs v. de Maziroff, 263 N.Y. 473, 477, 189 N.E. 555, 556 (1934); Lese v. Lamprecht,
196 N.Y. 32, 36, 89 N.E. 365, 366 (1909). Under the Erie doctrine, therefore, a federal court
deciding a diversity case must apply the parol evidence rule of the applicable state. E.g.,
Centronics Financial Corp. v. El Conquistador Hotel Corp., 573 F.2d 779, 782 (2d Cir. 1978);
Lee v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 693, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 552
F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1977); see Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). See generally
Comment, New York Parol Evidence Rule: Procedural or Substantive Law, 29 CORNELL
L.Q. 545 (1944).
'4 See, e.g., Thomas v. Scutt, 127 N.Y. 133, 137, 27 N.E. 961, 962 (1891). Although the
parol evidence rule had been criticized because its inflexible nature fostered unfairness, it
now is denounced for the numerous exceptions which were developed to cure its inflexibility.
See Sweet, Contract Making and Parol Evidence: Diagnosis and Treatment of a Sick Rule,
53 CORNELL L. Rav. 1036, 1036 (1968). Indeed, Professor Corbin once stated that the parol
evidence rule "already has so many exceptions that only with difficulty can it be correctly
stated in the form of a rule." Corbin, Conditional Delivery of Written Contracts, 36 YALE
L.J. 443, 456 (1927).
The parol evidence rule does not bar evidence of a prior agreement when the rule is
"inapplicable" or if a "real exception" applies. See Thomas v. Scutt, 127 N.Y. 133, 137, 27
N.E. 961, 962 (1891). The terms "exception" and "inapplicable," however, have been used
interchangeably by the courts. Compare Bareham & McFarland, Inc. v. Kane, 228 App. Div.
396, 401, 240 N.Y.S. 123, 130 (4th Dep't 1930) (the rule is inapplicable when fraud is raised)
with Cortlandt v. E.F. Hutton, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (fraud classified as
exception to rule). Generally, the parol evidence rule is considered inapplicable when evi-
dence is offered to explain ambiguities, see, e.g., M. O'Neil Supply Co. v. Petroleum Heat &
Power Co., 280 N.Y. 50, 55, 19 N.E.2d 676, 678 (1939), to show the custom or usage of a
term, see, e.g., B.M. Heede, Inc. v. Roberts, 303 N.Y. 385, 390, 103 N.E.2d 419, 420 (1952),
or to establish the existence of a separate and distinct collateral contract, see, e.g., Mitchill
v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377, 381, 160 N.E. 646, 648 (1928); note 115 infra. One class of real excep-
tions to the rule permits the introduction of evidence which purports to show that a written
agreement is not a binding contract. These situations involve allegations of failure or want
of consideration, see, e.g., Ehrlich v. American Moninger Greenhouse Mfg. Corp., 26 N.Y.2d
1981]
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Thus, the rule does not exclude evidence of an independent agree-
ment between the parties which does not contradict the written
agreement in dispute.115 Moreover, since the parol evidence rule
applies only to the parties to the writing, "strangers" to the con-
tract may contradict its terms.11 It has been unclear, however,
255, 258, 257 N.E.2d 890, 892, 309 N.Y.S.2d 341, 343 (1970), illegality, see, e.g., 97 Fifth Ave.
Corp. v. Schatzberg, 283 App. Div. 407, 409, 128 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (1st Dep't 1954), or the
existence of a condition precedent to the effectiveness of the contract, see, e.g., Reynolds v.
Robinson, 110 N.Y. 654, 654, 18 N.E. 127, 128 (1888). But cf. Jamestown Business College
Ass'n v. Allen, 172 N.Y. 291, 296, 64 N.E. 952, 956 (1902) (parol evidence may not be used to
show condition subsequent to effectiveness of contract). Additionally, allegations of fraud in
the execution of a contract have been allowed to show that a written contract is not binding.
See, e.g., Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Universal Hous. Sys. of America, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 544,
552 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). A second class of exceptions involves cases which recognize that a valid
written contract exists but regard the contract as incomplete. In such cases, courts permit
the introduction of parol evidence to supply the missing material. See, e.g., Fogelson v.
Rackfay Constr. Co., 300 N.Y. 334, 339, 90 N.E.2d 881, 882 (1950); Thomas v. Scutt, 127
N.Y. 133, 138, 27 N.E. 961, 962-63 (1891).
Williston conceded that there is a trend towards increased liberalism in the admission
of parol agreements. S. WLLISTON, supra note 113, § 638. California, for example, has ex-
panded greatly the amount of extrinsic evidence allowed under the parol evidence rule. See
Note, The Parol Evidence Rule: Is It Necessary?, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 972, 980 (1969) [herein-
after cited as Note, Is It Necessary?]. Chief Justice Traynor has stated that credibility and
the circumstances surrounding the transaction should be the basis for determining the ad-
missibility of parol evidence, not the apparent completeness of the written agreement. Note,
Chief Justice Traynor and the Parol Evidence Rule, 22 STAN. L. REv. 547, 554-55 (1970).
One commentator has argued that California has virtually eliminated the parol evidence
rule. See Note, Is It Necessary?, supra, at 976 (1969). For a general criticism of the rule, see
Comment, Parol Evidence Rule-In Need of Change, 8 GONz. L. REv. 88 (1972).
1111 See, e.g., Gallo v. Swan Optical Corp., 78 App. Div. 2d 632, 633, 432 N.Y.S.2d 108,
110 (2d Dep't 1980); Town of Oyster Bay v. Forte, 34 Misc. 2d 5, 7, 219 N.Y.S.2d 456, 459
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1961). Under the collateral contract doctrine, evidence of a sepa-
rate and distinct agreement may be admissible. See Mitchill v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377, 380-81,
160 N.E. 646, 647 (1928). In Mitchill, the Court of Appeals enunciated three conjunctive
requirements for a finding that a collateral contract will not be subject to the parol evidence
bar. See id. at 381, 160 N.E. at 647. The agreement must be collateral in form. See, e.g.,
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Timon, 9 App. Div. 2d 1018, 1018, 194 N.Y.S.2d 429, 430 (4th
Dep't 1959). It must not contradict the written agreement. See, e.g., James A. Haggerty
Lumber & Mill Work, Inc. v. Thompson-Starrett Constr. Co., 22 App. Div. 2d 509, 510, 256
N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1013 (1st Dep't 1965). Finally, it must consist of terms that the parties
would not ordinarily be expected to embody in the writing. See, e.g., Ball v. Grady, 267 N.Y.
470, 472, 196 N.E. 402, 403 (1935). The collateral contract doctrine requires a court to deter-
mine initially the degree to which the written contract is integrated. See Note, Third Par-
ties, supra note 1, at 955-56. For a discussion of the collateral contract doctrine, see Wal-
lach, The Declining "Sanctity" of Written Contracts-Impact of the Uniform Commercial
Code on the Parol Evidence Rule, 44 Mo. L. REv. 651, 657-58; cf. McLauchlan, The Incon-
sistent Collateral Contract, 3 DALHousi L.J. 136 (1976) (discusses Canadian law and the
collateral contract doctrine).
I" See, e.g., Robert v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 240 N.Y.
474, 478, 148 N.E. 650, 651 (1925). When one of the parties in a suit involving a written
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whether a party will be barred by the parol evidence rule from in-
troducing evidence of a prior contradictory agreement between the
other party to the contract and a third party.1 7 Recently, in
Marine Midland Bank-Southern v. Thurlow,115 the Court of Ap-
peals held that evidence of a prior agreement between one of the
parties to the litigation and a third party may not be introduced if
it contradicts the terms of the contract between the litigants. 1 9
In Marine Midland, the defendants obtained a loan from the
plaintiff bank in order to purchase convertible debentures120 issued
by Conelec, Inc. (Conelec). 121 The debentures were pledged by the
contract is not a party to the agreement, this third party or "stranger" may be allowed to
contradict the writing under the stranger to the contract exception to the parol evidence
rule. See id. at 478, 148 N.E. at 651; Metz v. Lane Chair Rental, Inc., 16 Misc. 2d 735, 736,
181 N.Y.S.2d 740, 742 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1958), aff'd, 11 App. Div. 2d 741, 204
N.Y.S.2d 636 (2d Dep't 1960); Techno-Lectric Indus. Inc. v. Mohawk Elecs. Corp., 35 Misc.
2d 45, 46, 229 N.Y.S.2d 1019, 1021 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962). But see notes 158-160 and
accompanying text infra. The stranger exception has resulted from the general view among
the courts that the parol evidence rule binds only the immediate parties to the written
contract and their privies. See Note, Third Parties, supra note 113, at 959. It has been
noted that third party situations present one of the greatest areas of uncertainty regarding
the application of the parol evidence rule. Id. at 972. The courts have used the stranger to
the contract exception to mitigate the harsh and unjust results of strict application of the
parol evidence rule. Id. at 960.
117 See Traders' Nat'l Bank v. Laskin, 238 N.Y. 535, 542, 144 N.E. 784, 785 (1924). In
Traders' the Court of Appeals stated that "[d]ifficulties may arise in the application of the
so-called parol evidence rule, but it has never been held that a written agreement between
two parties excludes proof of an additional parol agreement between one of these parties
and a third party." Id. at 542, 144 N.E. at 785. The Traders' defendants delivered to the
plaintiff bank two promissory notes in renewal of two notes made by a third party named
Hurwitz. Id. at 539, 144 N.E. at 784. At the same time, the defendants delivered a mortgage
executed by Hurwitz as collateral. Id. The defendants claimed that the plaintiff orally
agreed to apply the mortgage to the defendants' debts before those of Hurwitz. Id. at 540,
144 N.E. at 785. The mortgage on its face provided only for the indebtedness of Hurwitz. Id.
at 144 N.E. at 785. The Court of Appeals held that the defendants were able to introduce
evidence of the oral agreement, reasoning that it did not contradict the mortgage and there-
fore was not prohibited by the parol evidence rule. Id. at 542, 144 N.E. at 785. Notwith-
standing the Court's statement that additional third party agreements are not barred by the
rule, it appears that the effect of contradictory agreements with third parties has not been
squarely addressed.
53 N.Y.2d 381, 425 N.E.2d 805, 442 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1981).
119 53 N.Y.2d at 388, 425 N.E.2d at 808, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
120 Convertible debentures have a dual nature. Like ordinary debentures they represent
a sum to be paid at a future date with interest, but they may be converted into stock at a
fixed price prior to the redemption date. Recent Decision, Reasonable Care Under the
U.C.C.: The Pledgee's Duty to Preserve Value of Convertible Debentures, 59 GEo. L.J. 240,
240 (1970). For a description of the duties of a pledgee holding convertible debentures as
security see Grace v. Sterling, Grace & Co., 30 App. Div. 2d 61, 64, 289 N.Y.S.2d 632, 637
(1st Dep't 1968).
1 53 N.Y.2d 381, 385, 425 N.E.2d 805, 806, 442 N.Y.S.2d 417, 418 (1981). The defen-
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defendants as collateral for the loan.122 Under the defendants' se-
curity agreement,123 the plaintiff was entitled to take, exchange, or
release additional collateral posted by any party at any time.'2 '
The agreement also authorized the plaintiff to direct the order or
manner of disposition of any collateral upon the defendants' de-
fault. 25 To induce the plaintiff to make the loan to the defen-
dants, 28 Conelec also executed a security agreement in the plain-
tiff's favor, pledging its equipment as security for any current and
future debts of Conelec to the plaintiff.127 This security agreement
was accompanied by a letter from Conelec stating that the pledge
of equipment secured the obligation of the debentures pledged by
the defendants. 28
The plaintiff originally credited the Conelec equipment to the
pledge supporting the defendants' loan but later changed its
records to list the equipment as security for loans subsequently
made to Conelec. 29 When Conelec went bankrupt, the plaintiff liq-
uidated the equipment, applying the proceeds to satisfy the loans
to Conelec.130 After demanding payment on the defendants' notes,
the plaintiff commenced an action to recover the unpaid bal-
ance.'3 ' As an affirmative defense, the defendants attempted to
prove an oral agreement between Conelec, the plaintiff, and them-
selves that equipment would be applied to satisfy the defendants'
debts before those of Conelec.132 The defendants also attempted to
introduce another agreement to the same effect between the plain-
tiff and Conelec.5 3 Special term held that the parol evidence rule
barred this evidence. 184 The Appellate Division, Third Depart-
dants signed and delivered notes totalling $100,000. Id.
122 Id.
123 The Marine Midland-Thurlow security agreement also included shares of stock in
other corporations. Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. Conelec was considering a public offering and needed interim financing. Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 385, 425 N.E.2d at 807, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
128 Id. at 386, 425 N.E.2d at 807, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 419. Pursuant to the after-incurred
debts provision in the Conelec-Marine Midland security agreement, the bank was entitled to
apply the Conelec security to loans made directly to Conelec. Id.
123 Id.
131 Id. The unpaid balance at the time the action was commenced was $95,000 plus
interest. Id.
132 Id.
M Id. at 388, 425 N.E.2d at 808, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
134 Id. at 386, 425 N.E.2d at 807, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
[Vol. 56:171
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ment, unanimously reversed,3 5 holding that the evidence in the re-
cord, including Conelec's letter to the plaintiff, established a
pledge to secure the debentures which was separate and distinct
from the defendants' agreement with the plaintiff and, therefore,
not barred by the parol evidence rule.136
On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals reversed. 37 Judge
Jasen, writing for the majority,"3 ' initially considered the alleged
oral agreement between the three parties.13 9 He noted that an
agreement requiring the plaintiff to apply the equipment to the
defendants' debt before Conelec's loans would contradict the pro-
vision of the written security agreement which entitled the plaintiff
to release and apply collateral as it saw fit.14 0 Judge Jasen observed
that this prior agreement was not separate and distinct from the
security agreement since Conelec's pledge was designed to induce
the plaintiff to make the loan to the defendants.14 1 These factors
led the majority to find that the parol evidence rule barred evi-
dence of the prior agreement.14 2 Considering the separate agree-
ment between Marine Midland and Conelec, Judge Jasen noted
"1 54 App. Div. 2d 383, 388 N.Y.S.2d 703 (3d Dep't 1976), rev'd, 53 N.Y.2d 381, 425
N.E.2d 805, 442 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1981). Judge Herlihy, writing for the court, was joined by
Judges Greenblott, Kane, Main, and Larkin. Judge Kane dissented in part on other
grounds.
" 54 App. Div. 2d at 389, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 707. The appellate division, distinguishing
the defendants' pledge of the debentures from Conelec's pledge of equipment, id. at 388, 388
N.Y.S.2d at 707, stated that the purpose of the Conelec security agreement was to protect
the debentures of the defendants. Id. at 390, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 708. Judge Herlihy noted that
although the security agreement between the plaintiff and the defendants allowed the bank
to exchange collateral securing the loan, neither this agreement nor Conelec's pledge gave
the plaintiff authority to exchange or release the security for the debentures. Id. at 389, 388
N.Y.S.2d at 707. Thus, he concluded, the plaintiff had no right to release the equipment
securing the defendants' rights under the debentures. Id. at 389-90, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 707.
11 53 N.Y.2d 381, 389, 425 N.E.2d 805, 808, 442 N.Y.S.2d 417, 420 (1981).
Is Judge Jasen was joined by Judges Jones, Fuchsberg, and Meyer. Chief Judge Cooke
dissented in a separate opinion in which Judges Gabrielli and Wachtler concurred.
1 53 N.Y.2d at 387-88, 425 N.E.2d at 807-08, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 419-20. Looking to the
tripartite oral agreement, Judge Jasen noted that it is well established that the parol evi-
dence rule prevents parties from contradicting or modifying their integrated written con-
tract with evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements between the parties. Id. at 387,
425 N.E.2d at 807, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
1-0 Id. at 387, 425 N.E.2d at 808, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 420. The Court noted that "the agree-
ment between [the] defendants and plaintiff [was] memorialized in their security agreement
and proof of any oral promise by plaintiff as to the initial application of the Conelec collat-
eral directly contradicts the provisions of that written contract." Id. at 388, 425 N.E.2d at
808, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 387, 388, 425 N.E.2d at 807, 808, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 419, 420.
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that since it was inconsistent with the written security agreement,
it also was barred, by the parol evidence rule.14
In a vigorous dissent, Chief Judge Cooke stated that "[t]he
majority. . . wholly misapplie[d] the parol evidence rule to a situ-
ation where it [was] simply not involved. '144 He emphasized that
the parol evidence rule applies only to prior agreements "'between
the parties.' ",145 Viewing the facts in Marine Midland as involving
two distinct agreements with different parties and subject mat-
ter, 46 he reasoned that the rule could not exclude the separate
agreement between Conelec and the plaintiff."4" Chief Judge Cooke
asserted that the majority was creating a new rule which bars evi-
dence of a completely separate agreement between other persons
on the ground that it may bear upon the rights of the parties to a
written contract. 48
It is submitted that the Marine Midland Court justifiably
held that the parol evidence rule applies to cases in which an
243 Id. at 388, 425 N.E.2d at 808, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 420. The Court noted that although
the rights as between the plaintiff and Conelec could be determined by reference to their
oral agreement, these rights were not in issue. The rights involved in the litigation, the
Court noted, were those between the plaintiff and the defendant, and thus could be deter-
mined only by looking to their written security agreement. Id. at 388-89, 425 N.E.2d at 808,
442 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
Id. at 389, 425 N.E.2d at 808, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 420 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting).
141 Id., 425 N.E.2d at 809, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 421 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting).
246 Id. at 389-90, 425 N.E.2d at 809, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 421 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting). The
dissent viewed the transactions as involving two distinct and separate agreements which
secured different subjects. Id. (Cooke, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Cooke stated that while
Conelec was securing the defendants' loans and its own debentures, the defendants were
securing their own loan with the bank. Id. (Cooke, C.J., dissenting).
147 Id. at 389, 425 N.E.2d at 809, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 421 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting). Chief
Judge Cooke relied on Traders' Nat'l Bank v. Laskin, 238 N.Y. 535, 542, 144 N.E. 784, 785
(1924), for the proposition that the parol evidence rule does not bar proof of a parol agree-
ment between a third party and one of the parties to a written agreement. 53 N.Y.2d at 389,
425 N.E.2d at 809, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 421 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting). For a discussion of Trad-
ers' Nat'l Bank, see note 117 supra.
The dissent conceded that the parol evidence rule would bar evidence of a prior oral
agreement between the litigants regarding the plaintiff's use of the collateral because the
written security agreement between the parties gave the plaintiff the right to accept or re-
lease additional collateral on the notes in its discretion. 53 N.Y.2d at 390, 425 N.E.2d at 809,
442 N.Y.S.2d at 421 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting). The dissent noted, however, that the existence
of a separate written agreement between the plaintiff and Conelec would not bar parol evi-
dence of a promise by the plaintiff to Conelec to apply the equipment first to the defen-
dants' debentures. Id. (Cooke, C.J., dissenting).
14s 53 N.Y.2d at 391, 425 N.E.2d at 809-10, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 421-22 (Cooke, C.J., dis-
senting). Chief Judge Cooke referred to the majority's decision as a "radical departure from
well-settled rules of law." Id., 425 N.E.2d at 810, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 422 (Cooke, C.J.,
dissenting).
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agreement with a third party is offered as evidence to contradict
the terms of the contract in issue. In doing so, the Court has im-
plicitly refused to expand the rule's collateral contract exception.
Under this doctrine, a prior or contemporaneous collateral agree-
ment between the parties is admissible if it is separate and distinct
from, but consistent with, the terms of the writing, and does not
pertain to something ordinarily expected to be embodied in the
written contract.149 If a prior or contemporaneous agreement be-
tween the parties contradicts the written contract, however, it may
not be introduced.150 It is suggested that the same result should
obtain when one party attempts to assert rights under a collateral
agreement as a third party beneficiary. 51 Indeed, the Marine Mid-
land defendants attempted to benefit from the plaintiff's promise
to Conelec as if they were parties to the prior agreement.5 2 Under
the collateral contract doctrine, however, the defendants could not
vary the terms of their written contract with the plaintiff even if
they had been parties to the prior agreement. 53
1'9 See note 115 and accompanying text supra. Although the Court did not expressly
invoke the collateral contract exception, its reasoning was quite similar to that involved
under this doctrine. Indeed, the majority noted that the oral agreement between Conelec
and the plaintiff was separate and distinct from the written contract in issue, but did not
allow its introduction because it would have contradicted the writing. 53 N.Y.2d at 389, 425
N.E.2d at 808, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 420; cf. James A. Haggerty Lumber & Mill Work, Inc. v.
Thompson-Starrett Constr. Co., 22 App. Div. 2d 509, 510, 256 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1013 (1st
Dep't 1965) (to be admissible under collateral contract doctrine, separate and distinct agree-
ment must not contradict the writing). See generally Mitchill v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377, 160
N.E. 646 (1928); note 115 supra.
150 See, e.g., James A. Haggerty Lumber & Mill Work, Inc. v. Thompson-Starrett Con-
str. Co., 22 App. Div. 2d 509, 510, 256 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1013 (1st Dep't 1965).
151 One of the points made by the plaintiff's counsel was that if the defendants at-
tempted to assert rights as third-party beneficiaries, their claim would be subject to any
defenses that the plaintiff could have raised against Conelec. See Points of Counsel in
Marine Midland Bank-Southern v. Thurlow, 53 N.Y.2d at 383-84. For the defendants to be
considered third-party beneficiaries, Conelec must have intended to benefit them. The de-
fendants could not merely be incidental beneficiaries of the agreement. See, e.g., Associated
Flour Haulers & Warehousemen, Inc. v. Hoffman, 282 N.Y. 173, 180, 26 N.E.2d 7, 10 (1940);
Flemington Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Domler Leasing Corp., 65 App. Div. 2d 29, 33, 410
N.Y.S.2d 75, 77 (1st Dep't 1978), aff'd, 48 N.Y.2d 678, 397 N.E.2d 393, 421 N.Y.S.2d 881
(1979). Since the Court of Appeals decided the case on parol evidence grounds, it appears to
have been unnecessary for the Court to address issues concerning third-party beneficiary
theory.
15 See note 40 and accompanying text supra. Under a third-party beneficiary theory,
the defendants would have a claim against the plaintiff as promisor, see Lawrence v. Fox, 20
N.Y. 268, 272 (1859), and any rights they had against the promisee, Conelec, would con-
tinue. See Vulcan Iron Works v. Pittsburg-Eastern Co., 144 App. Div. 827, 831, 129 N.Y.S.
676, 679 (3d Dep't 1911). See generally J. CALARmI & J. PERILLO, supra note 113, at 625-29.
153 See note 149 supra.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Moreover, if a party is aware of a right that he has under one
contract as a third party beneficiary, any subsequent inconsistent
agreements that he makes with a party to that contract can be
viewed as a waiver of his rights under the prior contract.154 In this
instance, after the plaintiff allegedly had promised Conelec that it
would apply the equipment to the defendants' debt before
Conelec's loans, 55 the defendants authorized the plaintiff to en-
force and release collateral in its discretion. e5 6 Thus, it seems that
even if parol evidence of the plaintiff's prior agreement had been
introduced, the defendants may have lost the case through a
waiver of their rights.
Finally, it is submitted that the Court of Appeals could have
avoided its extended examination of the transactions involved in
Marine Midland by prohibiting the defendants from varying the
terms of the written agreement between the plaintiff and Conelec.
Although it is true that a third party may sometimes contradict an
integrated agreement under the stranger to the contract exception
to the parol evidence rule,157 this doctrine has only limited applica-
tion.5 8 Indeed, it has been recognized that even a stranger cannot
vary the terms of an agreement if he is asserting legal rights under
the written contract.159 In Marine Midland, the defendants at-
" A third-party beneficiary is said to have contract rights despite the absence of priv-
ity. 4 A. CosIN, supra note 113, § 779J, at 59. One way in which a party may "waive" his
contract rights is by entering into a subsequent agreement which substitutes new terms for
old ones existing under the original contract. 5 S. WILLISTON, supra note 113, § 679. In this
situation, the party is said to have rescinded the inconsistent terms of the prior agreement.
Id.
"'5 53 N.Y.2d at 385-86, 425 N.E.2d at 807, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
"6 Id. at 385, 425 N.E.2d at 806, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
"' See note 116 and accompanying text supra.
"' In Oxford Commercial Corp. v. Landau, 12 N.Y.2d 362, 190 N.E.2d 230, 239
N.Y.S.2d 865 (1963), the Court of Appeals stated that
[a]lthough it is sometimes broadly observed that the parol evidence rule has no
application to any except parties to the instrument, it is clear that in the case of a
fully integrated agreement, where parol evidence is offered to vary its terms, the
rule operates to protect all whose rights depend upon the instrument even though
they were not parties to it.
Id. at 365-66, 190 N.E.2d at 231, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 867 (citations omitted).
" See, e.g., Oxford Commercial Corp. v. Landau, 12 N.Y.2d 362, 365-66, 190 N.E.2d
230, 231, 239 N.Y.S.2d 865, 867 (1963); Vinciguerra v. State, 38 App. Div. 2d 607, 608, 326
N.Y.S.2d 293, 295 (3d Dep't 1971). Some courts have noted that the stranger to the contract
exception applies only when the third party is asserting "a right independent of, and not
growing out of, the instrument, or when the right asserted does not originate in the relations
established by the instrument." Spingarn v. Rosenfeld, 4 Misc. 523, 527, 24 N.Y.S. 733, 736
(N.Y.C. C.P. Gen. T. N.Y. County 1893); accord, Vinciguerra v. State, 38 App. Div. 2d 607,
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tempted to assert rights under the written agreement between the
plaintiff and Conelec and to prove these rights through parol evi-
dence. e0 Thus, the defendants should not have been able to intro-
duce this extrinsic evidence as "strangers." If the Court of Appeals
had taken this approach, it seems that the defendants would not
have been able to cast doubt upon the express terms of their own
agreement with the plaintiff.
Robert J. Sorge, Jr.
Harassment violation conviction cannot be the basis for the use of
collateral estoppel in a subsequent civil action
The doctrine of collateral estoppel fosters judicial economy by
prohibiting the relitigation of previously adjudicated issues.'16 In
practice, the doctrine is not applied unless an adjudicated issue is
shown to be identical to and dispositive of the issue in the instant
case. 162 Moreover, it must be established that the parties to the
original action had a "full and fair opportunity to contest" the is-
sue sought to be relitigated.' 53 In assessing whether such a "full
608, 326 N.Y.S.2d 293, 295 (3d Dep't 1971); County Trust Co. v. Mara, 242 App. Div. 206,
208, 273 N.Y.S. 597, 600 (1st Dep't 1934), af'd, 266 N.Y. 540, 195 N.E. 190 (1935).
16 53 N.Y.2d at 387, 425 N.E.2d at 808, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
"I Collateral estoppel is intended to prohibit the relitigation of previously adjudicated
issues, since such relitigation is considered "an unjustifiable duplication, an unwarranted
burden on the courts as well as on opposing parties." SIEGEL § 442, at 585; see Hoag v. New
Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 470 (1958); B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 144-45, 225
N.E.2d 195, 197, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 599 (1967); Good Health Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Emery,
275 N.Y. 14, 18, 9 N.E.2d 758, 759 (1937); Rosenberg, Collateral Estoppel in New York, 44
ST. JOHN's L. REv. 165, 166 (1969). The doctrine of collateral estoppel developed as a corol-
lary to the doctrine of res judicata, Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Lopez, 46 N.Y.2d
481, 485, 386 N.E.2d 1328, 1331, 414 N.Y.S.2d 308, 311 (1979); Weiner v. Greyhound Bus
Lines, Inc., 55 App. Div. 2d 189, 191, 389 N.Y.S.2d 884, 886 (2d Dep't 1976), which "requires
that when a cause of action has been adjudicated on the merits, the parties to the action are
bound by the judgment and may not relitigate the same cause of action between them-
selves." 5 WK&M 5011.24, at 50-116.2. The primary distinction between the two doctrines
is that res judicata applies to entire causes of action or defenses while collateral estoppel
applies to issues. SIEGEL § 457; see Rosenberg, Collateral Estoppel in New York, 44 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 165, 165-69 (1969).
162 See Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 246 N.E.2d 725, 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d
955, 960 (1969); Trombley v. Malloy, 66 App. Div. 2d 1020, 1020, 412 N.Y.S.2d 62, 63 (4th
Dep't 1978), af'd, 50 N.Y.2d 46, 405 N.E.2d 213, 427 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1980); Hurlburt v.
Chenango County Dep't of Social Servs., 63 App. Div. 2d 805, 806, 405 N.Y.S.2d 153, 155
(3d Dep't 1978).
"163 Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 246 N.E.2d 725, 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955,
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